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John E. Collins* and Edna I Ramon**
HIS Article reviews the substantive and procedural changes in
Texas workers' compensation law that occurred during 1982, a
non-legislative year, as reflected by appellate decisions. The Texas
Workers' Compensation Act' (the Act), adopted in 1913, continues to re-
tain amazing vitality. Novel and complex questions of substantive and
procedural law continue to arise under the Act. Although workers' com-
pensation law is governed by statute in Texas, appellate decisions substan-
tially affect practice in this area.
I. SUBSTANTIVE LAW
4. Course and Scope of Employment
The Texas Act covers a worker's injury only if the injury is sustained in
the course of employment.2 The question of when an employee is on the
job would seem to be relatively easy to answer. Each year, however, Texas
appellate courts consider this issue as it arises in varying fact situations.
During this survey year several cases involved employees injured while
allegedly in a state of intoxication caused by alcohol or other substances.
The Act specifically provides that the term "injury sustained in the course
of employment" does not include an injury caused while in a state of in-
toxication. 3 In Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Silas4 the insurer appealed
from an adverse judgment, contending that the Act did not cover an injury
an employee received while in a state of intoxication caused by marijuana.
The employee argued that intoxication is a condition brought on by the
use of alcohol.5 The Beaumont court of appeals agreed, holding that the
term "intoxication" must be given its plain meaning. 6 The court relied on
an earlier decision, Campos v. State,7 which found that intoxication meant
*B.A., Baylor University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Irving, Texas.
** B.S., J.D., University of Texas. Assistant Attorney General, Austin, Texas.
1. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANNmi. arts. 8306-8309i (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1982-1983).
2. Id art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
3. Id The Act does not define the term "intoxication."
4. 631 S.W.2d 551 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982), writ refd n.r.e per curiam, 635
S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1982).
5. The employee cited dictionary definitions of the term "intoxication" and noted that
the intoxication provision was placed in the Act in 1917. 631 S.W.2d at 552.
6. Id at 553.
7. 623 S.W.2d 657 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). The appellant in Campos contended that a
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under the influence of intoxicating liquor.8 Thus, the Beaumont court af-
firmed the judgment, holding that marijuana use did not cause intoxica-
tion as used in the exception to coverage of the Act. 9
The Texas Supreme Court refused the writ in Silas in a per curiam opin-
ion. 10 The court held that no evidence of intoxication of any kind existed
at the time of the injury, so the judgment in favor of the employee was
proper. " I The court noted that its refusal of a writ could not be interpreted
as approving the holding of the court of appeals that intoxication under
the act results only from use of alcohol.' 2 The court reserved that question
for future determination.' 3
The intoxication defense was likewise raised in Welch v. Texas Employ-
ers' Insurance Association.14 The decedent, Alan Welch, was found
drowned in a tank containing crude oil. The insurer claimed in defense
that Welch was intoxicated at the time of death.' 5 A fellow employee testi-
fied that on a prior occasion Welch told him he had become intoxicated by
sniffing gas. Thus, the insurer argued that Welch had entered the tank to
sniff gas. The evidence developed at trial, however, did not indicate that
Welch had sniffed gas on the day in question. The Eastland court of ap-
peals held that the statement made by Welch concerning an isolated snif-
fing of gas at some unrelated time was simply an inadmissible statement of
prior conduct. 16 The court reversed the trial court decision because the
fellow employee's testimony had probably caused an improper judgment
in favor of the insurer.' 7
Another case concerning the scope of employment under the Act, Trans-
port Insurance Co. v. Liggins,18 involved coverage of injuries caused by
acts of God. Under the Act such injuries are not included within the scope
of employment unless the employee is injured while performing activities
that subject him to a greater hazard than the general public. 19 Liggins, a
truck driver, was killed during a tornado while driving his truck-tractor on
an interstate through Wichita Falls. At trial, the claimants, the decedent's
wife and children, called as an expert witness a Wichita Falls police officer
statute prohibiting the sale of beer to an intoxicated person was defective for failure to de-
fine intoxication. Id at 658.
8. Id. at 659.
9. 631 S.W.2d at 553.
10. 635 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. 1982).
11. Id The trial court had refused to submit an issue on intoxication to the jury. Id
12. Id
13. Id
14. 636 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
15. The evidence established Welch's blood alcohol level at. 14%. There was testimony
that such a percentage represented intoxication. Id at 453.
16. Id at 454. Statements made by parties, whether deceased or not, relating to past
conduct are not admissible, except in will cases. Id; see West v. Austin Nat'l Bank, 427
S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, writ reed n.r.e.).
17. 636 S.W.2d at 455.
18. 625 S.W.2d 780 (Tex. Ct. App.-mFort Worth 1981, writ retd n.r.e.).
19. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § 1 (Vernon 1967). The Act does not define
an act of God. In Liggins the trial court's charge to the jury defined an act of God as an
accident exclusively due to "the violence of nature." 625 S.W.2d at 782-83.
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who testified that, in his opinion, a person in a vehicle during a tornado
has a greater chance of injury than one who is not. The evidence also
established that Liggins had no radio in his truck by which he might have
received warning of the approaching storm. The Fort Worth court of ap-
peals found sufficient evidence that Liggins was acting in the course of his
employment at the time of his death and upheld a jury verdict in favor of
the claimants. 20
Disputes concerning the nature and scope of employment frequently
arise in the context of assaults on employees. Several cases during the sur-
vey year involved such disputes. In Harris v. Casualty Reciprocal Ex-
change2' a company vice-president was killed while serving as manager of
the club in place of another manager who had terminated his employment.
Article 8309, section la of the Act covers a corporate officer if the sub-
scriber provides such coverage in its insurance contract. 22 In a suit
brought by Stone's survivors the insurance company defended on the
ground that Stone was not covered by such an endorsement on the corpo-
ration's policy. Stone's survivors argued that the corporation employed
the decedent in two capacities, as officer and as manager, and that he was
covered by the Act in the latter capacity. The court of appeals reversed a
judgment on a jury verdict in favor of the claimants, holding that Stone's
position as a corporate officer barred recovery. 23
The Texas Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the court of ap-
peals.24 The supreme court found the "dual capacity doctrine" applicable
to allow recovery. 25 This doctrine provides that an executive officer may be
considered to be in an employer-employee relationship under the Act "if,
at the time of an injury, he is performing the tasks of an ordinary em-
ployee, as distinguished from his usual executive activities. ' 26 Justice
Pope reviewed the history of the dual capacity doctrine in Texas and noted
that after the Texas Supreme Court set forth the doctrine in two early
cases, 27 the Texas Legislature amended section la of the Act in 1923 to
prevent application of the doctrine to corporate officers regardless of other
services performed. 28 In 1965 the legislature reversed its position and
amended the statute to provide coverage to all corporate officers.29 The
legislature amended the Act once again in 1967, creating the current elec-
tive provision.30 The supreme court held that this current provision allows
20. 625 S.W.2d at 783, 785.
21. 632 S.W.2d 714 (Tex. 1982).
22. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § la (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
23. 623 S.W.2d 154, 157 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1981).
24. 632 S.W.2d at 719.
25. Id at 718.
26. Id at 715.
27. Cook v. Millers' Indem. Underwriters, 240 S.W. 535 (Tex. Comrn'n App. 1922,
judgmt adopted); Millers' Mut. Casualty Co. v. Hoover, 233 S.W. 863 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1921, judgmt adopted).
28. 1923 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 177, § BI, at 388.
29. 1965 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 695, § 1, at 1625.
30. 1967 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 192, § 1, at 426.
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application of the dual capacity doctrine.3' Since Stone was working in a
second capacity as a manager at the time of his death, the doctrine applied
to bring him under the Act. 32 The court noted that had another person
been hired by the corporation to act as night manager, and had he received
injuries in that capacity, he clearly would have been entitled to the benefits
provided by law.33 Thus, Stone was considered to be acting within the
scope of his employment under the Act.
Another fatal assault on an employee gave rise to the dispute in Ameri-
can States Insurance Co. v. Wallers.34 Survivors of Ivan Justice, the dece-
dent, alleged that he had been killed in the course and scope of his
employment with an interior design and finishing company. Justice had
made a business trip to the Dallas-Forth Worth Airport and was found
shot to death in a field in Irving, Texas. No witnesses observed the shoot-
ing, and the killer's motive remained unknown. Article 9302, section 1 of
the Act excludes coverage of injuries "caused by an act of a third person
intended to injure the employee because of reasons personal to him and
not directed against him as an employee, or because of his employment. ' '3
5
The burden of proof is on the claimant to show that an assault upon a
person was directed against him as an employee or because of his employ-
ment.36 The Tyler court of appeals reversed the judgment in favor of Jus-
tice's survivors, holding there was no evidence as to why Justice was
killed.37 Thus, he could not be held to have died in the course and scope
of his employment. 38
A lack of evidence as to the circumstances of death also prevented the
survivor of a deceased employee from recovering benefits in International
Insurance Co. v. Deatherage.39 Deatherage, the employee, died in a fire
that destroyed his house trailer. Deatherage worked as a night watchman
at an abandoned asphalt plant. He lived in his trailer, which was parked
on the premises of the plant. Fragments of Deatherage's skull were recov-
ered from the ashes of the trailer, but no other evidence concerning the
circumstances of the fire could be found. In an earlier appeal the Texas
Supreme Court ruled that a jury finding in favor of the decedent's widow
should be upheld.4° On remand, however, the Austin court of appeals
held the evidence insufficient to show that the employee's death occurred
31. 632 S.W.2d at 718.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 636 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, writ granted).
35. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8309, § I (Vernon 1967).
36. 636 S.W.2d at 796; see Davis v. Maryland Casualty Co., 243 F.2d 463, 464 (5th Cir.
1957); Highlands Underwriters Ins. Co. v. McGrath, 485 S.W.2d 593, 595 (Tex. Civ. App.-
El Paso 1972, no writ); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co. v. England, 212 S.W.2d 964, 967 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1948, no writ).
37. 636 S.W.2d at 796.
38. Id at 797.
39. 628 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Ct. App.-Austin 1982, no writ).
40. 615 S.W.2d 181, 183 (Tex. 1981). For an analysis of the previous proceedings, see




in the course of employment as required by article 8309, section 1 of the
Act.41 The court noted that no one had seen the fire or could testify as to
its cause. Thus, the decedent's widow had failed to prove that Deather-
age's death was in any way related to his employment. 42 In dissent Chief
Justice Phillips contended that Deatherage's widow should be entitled to
the benefit of a presumption that her husband died in the course of his
employment. The applicable rule, according to the chief justice, provides
that when an employee is found dead at a place where his duties require
him to be, a presumption that the accident occurred in the course of em-
ployment exists under the Act.43
Although the Act makes no mention of the term "horseplay" in article
8309, section 1, Texas courts have held that an employee will be denied
benefits if he willingly engages in horseplay, and such activity results in
injury to him.44 In United General Insurance Co. v. Brown45 the insurance
company contended that Brown, the decedent, died while engaging in
horseplay with other employees. Brown died after falling out of the back
of a company pickup. The evidence indicated, however, that the activity
had ceased, and the employees had seated themselves in the pickup prior
to the accident. The Amarillo court of appeals upheld the sufficiency of
evidence to support the jury's award of compensation to Brown's survivors
under the Act.46
B. Employee Versus Independent Contractor
Only one case during the survey year dealt with the issue of whether an
employee was an independent contractor or an employee covered by the
Act. In Grimes v. Jalco, Inc. 47 Jimmy Harold Grimes filed a claim for
workers' compensation benefits with the Industrial Accident Board.
Grimes claimed to be an employee of Jalco. Jalco's compensation carrier
contended, however, that Grimes was not an employee but rather an in-
dependent contractor. Grimes appealed the board award of compensation
benefits to the district court, alleging in his petition that he was either an
independent contractor or an employee. Grimes joined the alleged em-
ployer, Jalco, Inc., and Jalco's compensation carrier as defendants. The
district court granted summary judgment for Jalco, apparently holding
that Grimes was an employee as a matter of law.4 8 The only evidence of
41. 628 S.W.2d at 212.
42. Id at 211.
43. Id. ; see Scott v. Millers Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 524 S.W.2d 285, 288 (Tex. 1975).
44. Lesco Transp. Co. v. Campbell, 500 S.W.2d 238, 241 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1973, no writ); Southern Sur. Co. v. Shook, 44 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1931, writ ref'd).
45. 628 S.W.2d 505 (rex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, no writ).
46. Id. at 509. The trial court instructed the jury that "'[i]f the employee voluntarily
turns aside from the duties of his employment and willingly engages or participates in an act
of horseplay or practical joking, an injury resulting from such act is not in the course of
employment.'" Id
47. 630 S.W.2d 282 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
48. Id at 283.
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Grimes's employee status, however, was Grimes's claim of compensation
benefits before the board and the admissions made by the compensation
carrier and the employer in their pleadings. The appellate court noted that
a party's statements before the Industrial Accident Board could be held to
be admissions against interest, but were not judicial admissions. 49 The
court found a factual dispute concerning Grimes's status as employee or
independent contractor, and reversed the summary judgment on that is-
sue. 50 The appellate court also held that Grimes was not barred by an
election of remedies from seeking a common law remedy for the disability
period. 5' The appellate court found that Grimes had not accepted a final
board award, and thus had not made an election of remedies. The court
noted that Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 47 and 48 provide for alterna-
tive claims for relief. Those rules would apply to Grimes's claim on re-
mand to the trial court. 52
C. Medical Causation and Heart Attacks
Workers' compensation cases involving heart attacks are complicated
and challenging because medical causation-in-fact is difficult to prove. Ju-
dicial guidelines regarding proof necessary to establish causal connection
to the work place seem to fluctuate with the facts of each case. In Brown v.
Texas Employers' Insurance Association53 the Texas Supreme Court at-
tempted to clarify these evidentiary guidelines. The result is, nevertheless,
limited to the actual facts of the case, and the decision will probably have
little calming effect in this area of the law. The employee in Brown, a
forty-nine-year-old repairman for a telephone company, died of a heart
attack in 1979. His widow brought an action for death benefits, claiming
accidental injury produced by stressful working conditions. Brown had
been counseled about his unsatisfactory job completion time, work quality,
and absenteeism several times during the two years preceding his death. A
six-month probation given him for excessive absenteeism had expired two
months prior to his death. Brown worked on a particularly difficult case
two days before his death, and the unsatisfied customer called again on the
day of Brown's death. Brown's supervisor accompanied him on the job,
and the two worked out the problem after an hour and a half. The satis-
factory clearing time for an assignment was forty-eight to fifty-two minutes
per job. Brown's next assignment was to exchange telephones. At noon
that day he was found dead in his truck.
The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals
reversing the trial court's judgment awarding death benefits. 54 The
49. Id at 284. An admission against interest goes to the weight of the evidence. Id
50. Id at 285.
51. Id
52. Id
53. 635 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. 1982).
54. Id at 417. The court of appeals emphasized the lack of any physical strain caused
by Brown's activities on the day of death, and found no evidence of any mental stress. 622
S.W.2d 608, 609-10 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981).
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supreme court found no evidence of accidental injury compensable under
the Act. 5" The Court examined the evidence given by a co-worker and the
doctor who performed the autopsy. The co-worker had testified that in his
opinion the warnings received plus the particularly difficult case would
place stress on a person like Brown. The court held that this testimony did
not tend to prove that stress caused Brown's heart attack because the co-
worker knew none of the details of the events alleged to have caused the
heart attack. 56 The doctor's testimony was held inadequate for the same
reason; he did not know the details concerning the particular assignment
and was not familiar with Brown's temperament. Consequently, the court
held that the doctor did not have sufficient facts on which to base medical
opinion.5 7
The supreme court reaffirmed its holding in Olson v. HartfordAccident &
Indemnity Co. 58 that when there is no evidence of a particular event caus-
ing the injury, there can be no recovery. Mere evidence of a stressful job is
insufficient to prove that a heart attack is a compensable injury under the
Act.59 The court's opinion distinguished its decision in the present case
from its holding in Transportation Insurance Co. v. Maksyn. 6° According
to the court, Maksyn stands for the proposition that one may recover
workers' compensation for accidental injury due to mental trauma, but in
Olson there was simply no evidence of accidental injury compensable
under the Act.61
D. Good Cause
One case during the survey year discussed the issues of whether an em-
ployee had timely filed his worker's compensation claim, and whether
good cause justified a late filing. Article 8307, section 4(a) requires an em-
ployee to give notice of injury to his employer within thirty days after the
occurrence. 62 The injured worker must also file a claim for compensation
benefits within six months after the occurrence of the injury.63 For good
cause article 8307, section 4(a) allows a worker to pursue a claim that has
not met these filing requirements, which have been characterized as limita-
tions statutes.64
55. 635 S.W.2d at 417.
56. Id at 416.
57. Id. at 417.
58. 477 S.W.2d 859, 860 ('rex. 1972). In Olson the court affirmed a take-nothing judg-
ment for the claimant, finding no connection between the employee's heart attack and sev-
eral frustrating events three days beforehand. Id at 859-60.
59. 635 S.W.2d at 416; see Jackson v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 580 S.W.2d 70, 72 (Tex.
Civ. App.-El Paso 1979, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
60. 580 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. 1979).
61. 635 S.W.2d at 417.
62. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
63. Id
64. Lowe v. Pacific Employers Indem. Co., 559 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dal-
las 1977, writ ref'd n.r.e.). "The six months limitation provided by section 4a serves the
same function of all statutes of limitations, that is, to prevent litigation of stale claims and to
1983]
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In Camarillo v. Highlands Underwriters Insurance Co. 65 the trial court
granted summary judgment in favor of the insurance carrier because the
worker failed to file his claim for compensation benefits within six
months.66 The worker contended that because his employer had actual
notice of the injury his claim did not have to be filed within six months
after the date of injury. The Beaumont court of appeals held that the em-
ployer's actual knowledge removes the thirty-day notice requirement. 67
Actual knowledge does not, however, toll the six-month limitation
requirement. 68
The court noted that article 8307, section 7a provides that the six-month
time limit for filing the claim for compensation does not begin to run until
the employer's first report of injury (form E-1) has been filed with the In-
dustrial Accident Board. At the time of Camarillo's injury, the Act re-
quired the employer to file form E-1 only when an injured employee
missed more than one day's work within eight days after his injury.69 Arti-
cle 8307, section 7 was so interpreted in Lowe v. Pacic Employers Indem-
nity Co. 70 Since Camarillo missed no time within eight days of his injury,
his employer filed no report. The appellate court noted further that the
legislature amended this provision in 1979. An employer must now file a
report whenever the injured worker is absent from work for more than one
day.71
Camarillo contended that his employer's failure to file a notice of injury
denied his right to equal protection of the laws in violation of the four-
teenth amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, § 3 of
the Texas Constitution. Camarillo argued that even though he did not
sustain any disability within eight days following the occurrence, he was
entitled to the same tolling of the six-month limitation period as an em-
ployee who did sustain incapacity within the eight day period provided by
article 8307, section 7a. The appellate court rejected this argument, hold-
ing that this legislative classification was reasonable and justified under the
circumstances. 72
Camarillo did not claim that there was good cause for his failure to file
within the six-month period. If the injured employee immediately sustains
no incapacity, however, then good cause might well exist for failure to file
the claim in a timely manner. As the Beaumont court of appeals noted, if
provide for investigation when all matters surrounding the accident . ..are fresh in the
minds of all parties." Id.
65. 625 S.W.2d 11 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1981, no writ).
66. Id at 11.
67. Id at 12.
68. Id.
69. 1947 Tex. Gen. Laws, ch. 113, § 12, at 181.
70. 559 S.W.2d 370, 372 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, writ refd n.r.e.). The court in
Lowe also held that when an employer does not file a report in such circumstances, the six-
month limitation provision is not tolled. Id
71. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 7 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
72. 625 S.W.2d at 13.
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no incapacity results, no claim need be filed. 73
This case illustrates the confusion arising under the earlier law from the
interpretation given in Lowe. The insurance carrier could argue that the
time period for filing the employee's notice of injury and claim for com-
pensation benefits began on the date of actual injury even though the em-
ployee had not missed any time from work, and even though he had not
sustained any incapacity during the six-month period. Under the same
law, however, an employer was not required to file the first report of injury
unless the employee had missed more than one day's work within eight
days of his injury. The legislative changes in article 8307, section 7 should
remedy these inconsistencies.
E. Attorneys' Fees
Disputes continue to arise concerning the circumstances under which
attorneys' fees shall be paid in a lump sum in death benefit cases. Article
8306, section 8(d) provides that attorneys' fees shall be paid periodically
and not in a lump sum when the compensation carrier admits liability for
the death, but a dispute exists as to the proper beneficiary or benefi-
ciaries. 74 Slott v. Texas Employers' Insurance Association75 involved such
a dispute between Mary Stott, who claimed to be the deceased employee's
common-law wife, and Garnett Stott, the surviving mother of the dece-
dent. Both women filed claims seeking to recover death benefits under the
Act. The compensation carrier, Texas Employers', filed an answer in the
trial court alternatively denying liability and alleging status as a mere
stakeholder.
At trial all of the evidence dealt with the claims of the two women con-
cerning their status as beneficiaries. The compensation carrier offered no
evidence denying liability. The trial court decided the beneficiary issue in
favor of Mary Stott and awarded attorneys' fees to her in a lump sum. The
El Paso court of appeals reversed the award of attorneys' fees.76 The court
noted that even though Texas Employers' denied liability in its pleadings,
at trial all the parties treated the dispute as being between the beneficiaries.
Therefore, under article 8306, section 8(d) attorneys' fees should have been
awarded in periodic payments rather than in a lump sum.
77
The Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the award of attorneys'
fees in a lump sum was proper.78 Because the insurance carrier had con-
tested liability until the day of trial, the claimant was forced to prepare to
litigate that issue. An insurance carrier cannot avoid a lump sum pay-
ment, stated the court, by making a last minute admission of liability. 79
73. Id at 12; see Baker v. Westchester Fire Ins. Co., 385 S.W.2d 447, 449 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston 1964, writ refd n.r.e.).
74. TEx. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 8(d) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
75. 23 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 206 (Jan. 29, 1983).
76. 631 S.W.2d 573, 575 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1982).
77. Id at 574-75.
78. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 208.
79. Id
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F Suits Against Employers-Exclusive Remedies
Article 8306, section 3 provides that an employee's right to compensa-
tion benefits is his exclusive remedy against his employer. The Houston
[14th District] court of appeals considered this provision during the survey
period in a significant case dealing with an intentional tort action brought
by an employee against his employer and its agent. In Massey v. Armco
Steel Co. 80 the injured worker, Massey,. counterclaimed against the com-
pensation carrier's appeal of a ruling of the Industrial Accident Board and
also filed suit against his employer and its agent. Massey alleged that the
employer and its agent breached a duty of good faith and fair dealing
owed under the contract of insurance. The employer filed a motion for
summary judgment, contending that article 8306, section 3 barred the
worker's alleged cause of action against it and its agent. The trial court
granted the motion.
Significantly, the case did not involve a claim of bad faith dealing by the
insurance carrier. Rather, Massey contended that his employer and its
agent controlled the process of adjustment and settlement of his workers'
compensation claim with the compensation carrier. According to Massey,
the employer and the agent made the conscious decision that he was not
capable of withstanding extended settlement negotiations or a lengthy liti-
gation period. Massey also contended that the employer and the insurer
made the further conscious decision to aggravate his physical and mental
condition so as to force a smaller settlement.
The court of appeals, relying on article 8306, section 3, affirmed the
summary judgment.8' The court recognized that the Act does not bar an
employee from recovering against an employer for an intentional tort, al-
though neither an employer nor its agent is a proper party to a negligence
action.82 The court stated, however, that when an employee proceeds
under the Act and files a claim for benefits, he is then prevented from
asserting a common law action against the employer for an intentional
tort.8 3 Massey had filed such a claim for benefits. The majority opinion
further held that because an employer and its agents do not occupy the
same legal status as the compensation carrier, the employer and its agents
are not proper parties to a suit for an intentional tort arising out of the
handling of a workers' compensation claim.84 The insurer, not the em-
ployer, bears the ultimate responsibility for handling such a claim. Thus,
Massey had not alleged a cause of action against the employer or the
80. 635 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1982, writ granted).
81. Id. at 598.
82. Id; see Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 610 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. 1980) (intentional
torts); Paradissis v. Royal Indem. Co., 507 S.W.2d 526, 529 (Tex. 1974) (negligence).
83. 635 S.W.2d at 598;see Grove Mfg. Co. v. Cardinal Constr. Co., 534 S.W.2d 153, 155
(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.). This issue involves the elec-
tion of remedies doctrine, which was recently substantially modified in Bocanegra v. Aetna
Life Ins. Co., 605 S.W.2d 848 (Tex. 1980). Thus, Grove may no longer state the law.




Justice James filed a lengthy dissenting opinion that carefully reviewed
the laws of twenty-three other jurisdictions. Justice James stated that if a
conspiratorial relationship existed between the insurer and the employer
with regard to the processing of Massey's compensation claim, then Mas-
sey had stated a cause of action.86 Such a cause of action would lie outside
the employment relationship and thus would not be covered by the Act.
Justice James further noted that "[i]t would be naive to believe that in all
situations involving a breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing in in-
surance contracts the wrong-doing has never occurred with the knowledge,
consent or active participation of employers. T87 Since the wrongdoing oc-
curred separately from the industrial injury, Justice James believed the
employee should have had an opportunity to plead his cause of action. 88
G Wrongful Discharge
An employer may not discharge an employee for filing a compensation
claim in good faith under the Act.89 If a wrongful discharge occurs, the
employee may recover damages or be reinstated in his former position.90
In Hughes Tool Co. v. Richards91 the continuing dispute between Willie D.
Richards and Hughes Tool Company over an alleged wrongful discharge
once again appeared in the appellate opinions. Richards filed a suit under
article 8307c claiming that he was discharged from Hughes' employ for
making a workers' compensation claim. The trial court entered judgment
on a jury verdict awarding Richards $30,000 in damages under the Act.
The Houston [14th District] court of appeals reversed and rendered judg-
ment in favor of Hughes. 92 The Texas Supreme Court, however, reversed
that judgment and remanded the case back to the Houston court of ap-
peals for consideration of several points of error concerning factual
sufficiency. 93
The Houston court considered those points in the present case. The em-
ployer, Hughes, contended insufficient evidence existed that Richards was
discharged for filing a workers' compensation claim. The appellate court
noted that the plaintiff in a suit under article 8307c has the burden of es-
tablishing a causal link between the firing and the claim for workers' com-
pensation benefits. 94 The evidence in this case, the court held, did not
85. Id.
86. Id. at 605.
87. Id. Justice James observed that this is especially likely in workers' compensation
situations in which employers usually exercise considerable authority in the settlement prac-
tices of their insurers. Id.
88. Id at 605-06.
89. TEX REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § I (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
90. Id. § 2.
91. 624 S.W.2d 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
92. 610 S.W.2d 232 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1980).
93. 615 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. 1981).
94. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307c, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
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establish the causal link.95
The decision in the Hughes case seems to indicate that unless a claimant
has some direct evidence96 that he was discharged because of his workers'
compensation claim, no damages can be recovered under the anti-discrim-
ination provision, article 8307c. This case also illustrates the difficulty of
proving, in the absence of clear, direct evidence, why a particular person
was fired.
H Industrial Accident Board Procedures and Appeal Deadlines
Suit to set aside a ruling of the Industrial Accident Board must be filed
within twenty days of giving notice to the board of intent not to abide by
its award.97 This statutory requirement was again held mandatory and
jurisdictional in Cavazos v. Texas Employers Insurance Association.98 In
Cavazos the claimant filed suit two days past the twenty-day limitation
period. The Corpus Christi court of appeals upheld the trial court's dis-
missal of the suit on grounds of late filing. The court rejected the claim-
ant's argument that the limitation period should be enlarged under the
general policy of construing the Act liberally in favor of claimants. 99 Not-
ing that the claimant had not put the petition in the mail to the district
clerk prior to the expiration of the limitation period but instead had physi-
cally delivered the petition late, the court refused to enlarge the limitation
period on the basis of Ward v. Charter Oak Fire Insurance Co. 100 and Stan-
dardFire Insurance Co. v. LaCoke 101 Those two cases held that filing was
timely when the petition or notice of intention to appeal was mailed prior
to expiration of the twenty-day period.' 0 2
In Mainolfi v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co. 103 the Houston [14th Dis-
trict] court of appeals refused to excuse the claimant's late filing of suit
95. 624 S.W.2d at 600.
96. Direct evidence might be an admission by a supervisor, manager, or someone in
charge of hiring and firing. See E-Tex Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Adair, 566 S.W.2d 37, 40 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Beaumont 1978, no writ).
97. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). This section
also requires that notice of intention not to abide by the board's ruling be given to the board
within 20 days of the date of the award.
98. 631 S.W.2d 196 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
99. Id. at 197.
100. 579 S.W.2d 909 (Tex. 1979).
101. 585 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. 1979).
102. Standard Fire Ins. Co., 585 S.W.2d at 681; Ward, 579 S.W.2d at 911. A reading of
these two cases suggests that the primary distinction between the facts in them and in
Cavazos is that the claimants in both of the former cases had taken steps that would have
insured compliance with the 20-day limitations period of art. 8307, § 5 had it not been for
the errors of the governmental bodies to whom the documents were entrusted. In Ward the
claimant placed her notice of intention to appeal in United States first class mail prior to the
expiration of the 20-day time limit, but the notice was sent back to the claimant due to a post
office error. 579 S.W.2d at 910. Similarly, in Standard Fire Ins. Co. the insurance carrier's
petition would have been timely filed but for the district clerk's error in instructing the post-
man not to make a routine second daily mail delivery to the district clerk's office. 585
S.W.2d at 680. In Cavazos, however, the petition was physically delivered to the district
clerk's office by the claimant two days late. 631 S.W.2d at 197.
103. 624 S.W.2d 746 (Tex. Ct. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1981, no writ).
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despite the claimant's argument that lateness was due to the Industrial Ac-
cident Board's failure to notify the claimant of the date on which the board
received his notice of intent not to abide by the board's ruling. 10 4 The
court emphasized the claimant's failure to avail himself of any alternative
ways of insuring timely filing of suit in compliance with article 8307, sec-
tion 5 of the Act.105 The court declined to adopt a good cause exception to
the requirement of timely filing similar to that provided for notice of injury
filings under article 8307, section 4a of the Act. 0 6
Failure to file suit within the time limit prescribed by article 8307, sec-
tion 5 of the Act will support a motion for summary judgment against the
late-filing party even though the movant for summary judgment has not
previously denied alleged timely filing by verified pleadings.10 7 In Ameri-
can General Fire & Casualty Co. v. Weinberg'0 8 the compensation carrier
entered only a general denial to the claimant's petition and then moved for
summary judgment on grounds of late filing. The Texarkana court of ap-
peals reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the case be-
cause the movant had failed to deny timely filing of suit in its pleadings in
compliance with rule 93 of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure and article
8307b.109 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
affirmed the summary judgment. 0 According to the supreme court, the
court of appeals erred in reversing a nonfundamental error when neither
party had raised the issue of pleadings on appeal."
The Texas Supreme Court explored the collateral estoppel effect of a
ruling by the Industrial Accident Board upon a wrongful death action aris-
ing out of the same occurrence as an industrial injury in Puga v. Donna
Fruit Co. 112 The case involved a wrongful death action brought by survi-
vors of a farm laborer who was killed while loading fruit crates onto a
truck the defendant company owned. The survivors filed the suit while a
workers' compensation claim arising out of the same facts was pending
before the Industrial Accident Board. The board ruled that the deceased
had not been an employee of the defendant at the time of his death. The
claimants failed to appeal the board ruling but continued to pursue their
wrongful death action. Subsequently, the defendant moved for summary
judgment, asserting that the board's final ruling on the issue of the de-
ceased's employment status decided that issue in favor of the defendant in
the wrongful death action as well. The trial court granted the defendant's
104. Id. at 750.
105. Id at 749. The claimant could have sent his notice to the board by certified mail,
next-day delivery service, or filed a second notice, or filed suit before receiving the board's
acknowledgment of receipt. Id
106. Id at 748.
107. Verified pleadings are required by TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. Ar. art. 8307b (Vernon
1967).
108. 639 S.W.2d 688 (Tex. 1982).
109. Weinberg v. American Gen. Fire & Casualty Co., 626 S.W.2d 555, 557 (Tex. Ct.
App.-Texarkana 1981).
110. 639 S.W.2d at 690.
111. Id at 688.
112. 634 S.W.2d 677 (Tex. 1982).
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motion, and the court of appeals affirmed that decision. ' 3
The supreme court reversed and remanded, holding that since the In-
dustrial Accident Board's jurisdiction was limited to workers' compensa-
tion claims under the Act, the board ruling could have no collateral
estoppel effect in a negligence action brought by survivors of a farm la-
borer statutorily excluded from coverage under the Act."14 The court rea-
soned that since the defendant had not offered sufficient evidence of
voluntary coverage for farm laborers ordinarily excluded from coverage' 15
in support of its motion for summary judgment, insufficient proof had
been produced on the issue of whether the board possessed jurisdiction to
decide the question of employment. ' 6 Similarly, the court held that the
defendant had not adduced sufficient evidence proving voluntary coverage
under the Act of farm laborers employed by it so as to have required the
plaintiffs to notify the defendant of an election to pursue remedies in-
dependent of those available under the Act." 17
In Treybig v. Home Indemnity Co. 118 the Dallas court of appeals consid-
ered the extent by which a claim presented to the Industrial Accident
Board could vary from the claim presented in the suit appealing the board
award. The claimant filed a claim form with the Industrial Accident
Board describing the injury as a hurt hip and stating the date of injury as
May 26, 1978. The Industrial Accident Board denied the claim. On ap-
peal to the district court, the claimant's first amended original petition al-
leged that the harm to his hip was the result of repetitious physical
traumatic activities extending over a period of time in the course of his
employment. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendant, but overruled a plea to its jurisdiction.
The court of appeals held that because the variance between the claim
before the board and the claim in the suit was jurisdictionally fatal, the
plea should have been granted.' 9 The mere shift from claiming acciden-
113. 616 S.W.2d 666, 667 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1981).
114. 634 S.W.2d at 678; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 2 (Vernon Supp.
1982-1983), which excludes farm workers from coverage by the Act.
115. Voluntary coverage for statutorily excluded employees is permitted in TEX. REV.
CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 8308, § 18(a) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Id. § 18(b) gives the board
jurisdiction over employees protected by voluntary coverage.
116. 634 S.W.2d at 680. "In such instance, the Board's ruling of 'no employment' was
equivalent to a finding of 'no employment in a capacity covered under the Act'." Id at 678.
117. Id. at 680-81. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 3a (Vernon 1967) requires
notice to the employer of intent to pursue common law remedies.
The court's opinion suggests that there might be situations in which failure to appeal a
board ruling would operate as collateral estoppel (issue preclusion) in another suit brought
on the same facts. Suppose, for instance, that a claimant covered under the Act is injured in
the course and scope of his employment due to the alleged negligence of a third party.
Suppose further that the board, vested with jurisdiction over the claimant's workers' com-
pensation claim, determines that there was no loss of wage earning capacity, and the claim-
ant fails to appeal the board ruling but continues to pursue his third party action. This
opinion suggests that the third-party defendant might then be able to use the board's deter-
mination as collateral estoppel against the claimant on the question of whether the claimant
had suffered any loss of future earning capacity. 634 S.W.2d at 679.
118. 632 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ refd n.r.e.).
119. Id at 899.
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tal injury to asserting occupational disease did not trouble the court.
Rather, the court was persuaded by its conclusion that the board claim and
court pleading did not contain "the same basic description and nature of
the injury."' 20 Because of this variance, the defendant had not been given
sufficient opportunity to investigate the claim while the facts were still
fresh.12 '
Choice of a proper court in which to appeal a board ruling was consid-
ered in Standard Fire Insurance Co. v. Stigger. 2 2 The insurance carrier
appealed a board award of $2,377.62 to a county court at law, which has
jurisdiction when the amount in controversy does not exceed $5,000 exclu-
sive of interest.' 23 The claimant counterclaimed and obtained a jury ver-
dict of $34,692.21. The insurance carrier appealed, arguing that the county
court at law lacked jurisdiction to render judgment for an amount in ex-
cess of its statutory jurisdictional limits. The court of appeals affirmed,
relying on well-established authority 2 4 to hold that when the jurisdiction
of the county court at law is properly invoked over an amount in contro-
versy of less than $5,000 the court continues to possess jurisdiction to
render judgment for whatever amount is ultimately obtained by the
claimant. 25
I Occupational Disease Problems
Several cases during the survey year stressed the importance of con-
forming the pleadings and jury charge to the medical evidence presented
on causation. The courts emphasized the distinction between an occupa-
tional disease and an injury. An occupational disease causing general in-
capacity must also be distinguished from an occupational disease causing a
specific incapacity or injury.
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Turner' 26 Joe Lesly Tur-
ner, a cement worker for eight years, suffered symptoms of severe contact
dermatitis seven days after spilling cement in his boots. The disease mani-
fested itself in the form of blisters on his hands and feet. Turner claimed
total disability caused by an occupational disease. His treating dermatolo-
gist testified that Turner's contact dermatitis was an occupational disease
resulting from the development of a sensitivity to chromates, a substance
contained in cement. According to the dermatologist, the symptoms ap-
peared after the traumatic exposure but the sensitivity had developed ear-
lier. The doctor further testified that the sensitivity to chromates was an
120. Id at 898.
121. Id
122. 635 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, no writ).
123. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1970a (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
124. The court cited Mr. W. Fireworks, Inc. v. Mitchell, 622 S.W.2d 576, 577 (Tex. 1981);
Flynt v. Garcia, 587 S.W.2d 109, 109-10 (Tex. 1979); Haginas v. Malbis Memorial Found.,
163 Tex. 274, 278-79, 354 S.W.2d 368, 369-70 (1962); Isbell v. Kenyon-Warner Dredging
Co., 113 Tex. 528, 532, 261 S.W. 762, 763 (1924); Cook v. Jaynes, 366 S.W.2d 646, 647 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no writ).
125. 635 S.W.2d at 669.
126. 634 S.W. 2d 364 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1982, no writ).
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allergic condition affecting all the skin of Turner's body and that Turner
could not work with chromates because further contact could again cause
blistering. The court of appeals relied upon the dermatologist's testimony
in affirming a judgment for Turner for benefits based on total general inca-
pacity lasting seventy-one weeks due to an occupational disease. 2 7 The
court of appeals held that the evidence was legally and factually sufficient
to support the jury's finding of occupational disease and that there was
evidence of general incapacity not confined solely to plaintiffs hands and
feet. 128
Cearley v. Royal Globe Insurance Co. 129 presented a similar fact situa-
tion. In Cearley, however, the claimant alleged an injury rather than an
occupational disease, while the medical evidence supported only a claim
for occupational disease. The employee claimed injury on or about Janu-
ary 5, 1977, from exposure to fumes, but the evidence showed repeated
exposure to fumes with disease developing over a long period of time. The
claimant's doctor testified that he had no opinion as to whether the inhala-
tion of fumes on January 5, 1977, was the cause of the claimant's medical
problems. The court of appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment non
obstante veredicto in favor of the insurer, stating that the evidence showed
an occupational disease, if anything, which theory was not espoused by the
claimant either in his pleadings or at trial. 130
North River Insurance Co. v. Gomez 13 1 presented the question of
whether an occupational disease was a specific injury or a general injury.
The employee, Gomez, sustained chronic phlebitis in both legs. At trial
Gomez testified that he suffered with chills and fever as a result of the
phlebitis. His doctor's testimony, however, failed to state whether the
phlebitis affected other portions of Gomez's body or impaired his general
health. The trial court entered judgment on a jury verdict finding Gomez
had sustained a general injury caused by chronic phlebitis in both legs.
On appeal the insurance carrier challenged Gomez's pleading as inade-
quate to allege a general injury. The pleading alleged injury to both legs,
claiming that "[als a result of said damages or harm to the physical struc-
ture of the body occurring as the result of repetitious physical traumatic
activities, Plaintiff [appellee], is unable to do the usual and customary tasks
of a workman in such a way as to enable him to get and keep employment
127. Id. at 365.
128. Id
129. 632 S.W.2d 942 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, no writ).
130. Id at 945-46. The court cited Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. McFarland, 433
S.W.2d 534 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1968, writ refd n.r.e.); Frazier v. Employers Mut. Casu-
alty Co., 368 S.W.2d 955 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.) The court distin-
guished between accidental injury and occupational disease as follows:
An industrial accident or accidental injury is distinguished from an occupa-
tional disease by the following characteristics: An industrial accident or acci-
dental injury can always be traced to a definite time, place and cause, whereas
an industrial disease is of slow and gradual development, and the time, place
and cause thereof are not susceptible of definite ascertainment.
632 S.W.2d at 946 (citing Frazier, 368 S.W.2d at 955-56).
131. 632 S.W.2d 678 (Tex. Ct. App.-Tyler 1982, no writ).
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doing such work. 132 The case was tried and submitted to the jury on the
general injury theory. The court of appeals held that the pleading was
sufficient to allege a general injury, but noted the better practice would
have been to allege that the injury or occupational disease of the legs ex-
tended to and affected other portions of the worker's body or impaired his
general health. 133
The insurance carrier also claimed there was insufficient evidence of
general injury. The court of appeals reversed on this point, finding no
medical evidence that Gomez's phlebitis extended to and affected his body
generally. The court of appeals concluded that ordinarily proof that an
injury to a specific member extends to and affects the body generally must
be supported by expert medical testimony.' 34 In the interest of justice the
court of appeals remanded Gomez's case for a new trial since the case had
been tried on the wrong theory.' 35
A worker who sustains an occupational disease must give his employer
notice of the injury "within thirty (30) days after. . . the first distinct man-
ifestation of an occupational disease."' 136 The Corpus Christi court of ap-
peals considered the timing and manner of notice in Houston General
Insurance Co. v. Vera. 137 In that case the notice issue was submitted to the
jury on the basis of time elapsed after disability resulted rather than after
the first distinct manifestation of an occupational disease.' 38 The trial
court's judgment awarded benefits to the claimant, Vera, for total and per-
manent disability due to an occupational disease of degenerative arthritis
in the lower spine caused by repetitious trauma (repeated lifting). The
court of appeals held that any error in wording of the notice issue was
waived by the insurance company's failure to object. 139 The court noted,
however, that the issues as submitted could result in an enlargement of the
statutory time periods for notice since disability occurs subsequent to the
first distinct manifestation of disease.' 4° The court concluded, neverthe-
less, that it was not fundamental error to submit the issues as they were
phrased. 141
The insurer also argued that there was no evidence (or, alternatively,
insufficient evidence) to support a jury finding that the employer had re-
ceived notice of the disease within thirty days of the date of disability. The
132. Id. at 679.
133. Id
134. Id at 680 (citing Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Gonzales, 518 S.W.2d 524, 526
(Tex. 1975)); see Illinois Employers Ins. v. Wilson, 620 S.W.2d 169, 172-73 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1981, writ refd n.r.e.); Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Lucas, 547 S.W.2d
386, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler), rev'd on other grounds, 552 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. 1977).
135. 632 S.W.2d at 680.
136. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 4a (Vernon 1967).
137. 638 S.W.2d 102 (Tex. Ct. App.-Corpus Christi 1982, no writ).
138. Commercial Ins. Co. v. Smith, 596 S.W.2d 661, 665 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1980, writ ref d n.r.e.), established that the first distinct manifestation occurs when the claim-
ant recognizes the nature, seriousness, and work-related nature of the disease.
139. 638 S.W.2d at 105.
140. Id.
141. Id at 106 (citing DeAnda v. Home Ins. Co., 618 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. 1980)).
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court found sufficient evidence to show that Vera's foreman had actual
knowledge of Vera's disease. Knowledge of the foreman, stated the court,
meets the statutory requirements. 142 Following DeAnda v. Home Insurance
Co. , 43 the court concluded that notice need not be given in any particular
form and need not specify the exact nature of the injury or illness, because
the notice requirement exists only to provide the insurer an opportunity to
investigate. '"
The insurance company also challenged the trial court's judgment on
grounds that a claim had not been filed with the Industrial Accident Board
within six months after the disability was apparent. The court of appeals
held that the judgment was proper because under article 8307, section 7
the employer's failure to file the first report of injury (form E-1) tolled the
six-months limitations period for filing a claim. 45
J Prior Injuries
If a worker's injury results in incapacity that is also caused in part by a
previous compensable injury, the workers' compensation insurance carrier
is liable only for such compensation as would be due if no prior injury had
occurred.146 Predictably, if an injured worker has received a prior injury
the insurance carrier will try to bring that fact to the jury's attention. Like-
wise, the claimant's attorney will seek with equal vigor to keep out any
evidence of a prior injury. This rather common courtroom battle was
fought in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Torres. 47 In Torres
the claimant recovered benefits for total and permanent disability after
sustaining a work-related injury. She had previously been injured on the
job and the insurance carrier sought to submit issues to the jury dealing
with that prior injury. Neither of the two medical witnesses, however, tes-
tified that the claimant's earlier injury was a producing cause of her pres-
ent disability. Lay witnesses testified that some of the employee's
complaints following her current injury were similar to those voiced at the
time of her previous injury. The trial court refused to submit any issues
concerning the prior injury. The court of appeals affirmed, noting that no
testimony presented to the jury actually showed that the earlier injury con-
tributed to the present disability. 148 Thus, the trial court properly over-
ruled the insurance carrier's request for special issues concerning
contribution by the prior compensable injury. 14 9
142. 638 S.W.2d at 106;see Miles v. Commercial Ins. Co., 568 S.W.2d 912, 915 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1978, no writ); Belknap v. Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n, 556 S.W.2d 587, 588
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1977, no writ).
143. 618 S.W.2d 529, 532 (Tex. 1980).
144. 638 S.W.2d at 106.
145. Id
146. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 12c (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); see Trans-
port Ins. Co. v. Mabra, 487 S.W.2d 704, 707 (Tex. 1972).
147. 632 S.W.2d 820 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, no writ).




In Royal Globe Insurance Co. v. Suson 150 the injured worker had re-
ceived two back injuries prior to the 1980 injury that resulted in a jury
finding of total and permanent incapacity. The jury also found that one of
the prior injuries contributed thirty-five percent to the worker's present in-
capacity. On appeal the insurance carrier contended that the thirty-five
percent figure should be deducted from the compensation rate, which at
the time of the 1980 injury was $119.00 per week. The claimant argued,
however, that the thirty-five percent figure should be deducted from his
pre-injury average weekly wage. In this case reducing the claimant's pre-
injury average weekly wage by thirty-five percent still left enough pre-in-
jury wage earning capacity to cover the maximum compensation rate of
$119.00 per week. The Fort Worth court of appeals affirmed and adopted
the claimant's interpretation in reliance on two prior Texas appellate
opinions.'-'
K Nursing Service
Article 8306, section 7 provides that the insurance carrier shall be obli-
gated for the injured employee's medical aid, hospital services, and nurs-
ing services.' 52 The statute does not limit nursing services to those
provided by a hospital or professional nursing care service. In Houston
General Insurance v. Hamilton153 Carsum Wayne Hamilton received se-
vere injuries to his legs, back, and neck in a logging accident. During his
recovery his mother and grandfather provided nursing services. The trial
court awarded $6,000 for nursing services provided by these family mem-
bers based on the testimony of the nursing director of a large hosptial. The
court of appeals affirmed the award, observing that the nursing care al-




The Workers' Compensation Act was amended in 1977 to provide for
venue in the county where the injury occurred or in the county where the
employee resided at the time the injury occurred. 5 5 In Sauceda v. Home
Indemnity Co. 156 the trial court overruled the employee's plea of privilege
150. 626 S.W.2d 161 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1981, writ ref'd n.r.c.).
151. Id at 164-65; see Consolidated Casualty Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 419 S.W.2d 232, 237-
38 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1967, writ refd n.r.e.); Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.
v. Depoister, 393 S.W.2d 822, 829 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1965, writ refd n.r.e.).
152. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, §7 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
153. 634 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Ct. App.-Beaumont 1982, no writ).
154. Id at 20-21; see Transport Ins. Co. v. Polk, 400 S.W.2d 881, 884 (Tex. 1966).
155. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 8307, § 5 (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983): "Any inter-
ested party who is not willing and does not consent to abide by the final ruling and decision
of said Board shall. . . bring suit in the county where the injury occurred, or in the county
where the employee resided at the time the injury occurred .... "
156. 631 S.W.2d 256 (Tex. Ct. App.-Eastland 1982, writ dism'd).
19831
SO UTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
seeking to have the case transferred from the county where the injury oc-
curred to the county of his residence at the time of the injury. The insur-
ance carrier had filed suit first, but the employee argued that he had the
right under the statute to fix venue. The court of appeals upheld the trial
court's decision that venue could be maintained in the county of injury,
and that the injured employee could not insist that the case be transferred
to his county of residence. 57 The court stated that the 1977 amendment to
section 5-of article 8307 gave the association, as well as the employee, the
right to fix venue.' 58 Thus, the party filing suit first to set aside the award
of the Industrial Accident Board had the option of fixing venue in either
the county of injury or the county in which the employee resided at the
time of the injury. 159
In Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Spann,160 however, the as-
sociation's attempt to fix venue in the county where the injury occurred by
filing suit first failed. The association was not allowed to fix venue because
it had prevailed before the Industrial Accident Board and had no claim or
cause of action at the time it filed its suit.16 The board had found that the
evidence failed to establish that the claimant sustained a compensable in-
jury in the course of his employment. Despite the favorable award, the
insurer filed suit in the county of the alleged injury, but did not ask to have
the award of the board set aside and held for naught. Thereafter, the em-
ployee filed suit in his county of residence, and the insurer filed a plea of
privilege to have the suit transferred to the county of injury where its suit
was pending and first filed. 162 The trial court refused to transfer the case,
and the court of appeals affirmed.' 63 The court noted that the insurer
could fix venue by filing suit first only if it had a legitimate right to ap-
peal. 164 The court concluded that the insurance company had no right to
appeal to the district court from the award of the board for the simple
reason that it had prevailed before the board and, therefore, had no claim
or cause of action at the time it filed suit. 165 The court pointed out that
section 5 of article 8307 speaks of an appeal by an interested party not
157. Id at 257.
158. Id.; see Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Jones, 580 S.W.2d 889 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1979, no writ).
159. 631 S.W.2d at 257. The court did not consider the issue but suggested that, in addi-
tion to the plea of privilege, a motion for transfer may also be a proper vehicle for determin-
ing venue in workers' compensation cases. Id at 257 n.3.
160. 632 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. Ct. App.-Fort Worth 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
161. Id at 908.
162. The insurance company also filed a plea in abatement, alleging in the alternative
that the case filed by the employee in his county of residence should be abated pending the
outcome of the suit filed by the insurance company. The plea of abatement was also over-
ruled by the trial court, and the court of appeals affirmed. Id at 907-08.
163. Id at 908.
164. Id at 907. The court emphasized that under the Workers' Compensation Act first
filing the claim before the Industrial Accident Board is a jurisdictional requirement for filing
suit in district court. The suit in district court is thus an appeal from the award of the board.
Id.; see TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1982-1983).




willing to abide by the final ruling of the board, and that the insurance
company did not state, nor could it state, any reason for dissatisfaction
with the board's award.' 66
B. Evidence--Sufficiency
Cases involving sufficiency of the evidence on various degrees of a
worker's incapacity arise each survey year. Both claimants and insurance
carriers regularly contest jury findings on the basis of insufficient evidence
to support jury findings and on the basis that the findings are against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence. No hard and fast rules
emerged from the cases decided last year in this area.
Reviewing the jury's finding of total and permanent incapacity inAmeri-
can Home Assurance Co. v. Coronado ,167 the court of appeals examined
the many cases dealing with factual sufficiency urged by both the claimant
and the insurance carrier.' 68 The carrier relied on cases holding that the
evidence was insufficient to support a verdict of total and permanent inca-
pacity when the injured employee returned to lighter work and earned
more money after the injury. 169 The claimant cited cases holding that the
fact the employee had returned to work was not a bar to recovery for total
and permanent disability. 170 The court noted that these cases could not
easily be reconciled, if at all, but concluded that the cases consistently held
that no precise formula exists by which incapacity may be measured.' 7'
The court, therefore, reviewed the evidence of the case in detail. The
employee had returned to work after the accident, but the court empha-
sized co-workers' testimony that the employee was unable to perform the
same job and obtained lighter work by trading jobs with co-workers. The
court also noted that the employee would probably not be able to pass a
physical examination to obtain new employment. 172 Upholding the jury's
finding of total and permanent incapacity, the court refused to substitute
its judgment for that of the jury, noting that the duration and extent of
disability received from an injury is at best an estimate that must be deter-
mined by a jury from all the pertinent facts before it. 173
The court in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v. Sauceda 174 also
166. 632 S.W.2d at 908.
167. 628 S.W.2d 818 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1981, writ refd n.r.e.).
168. Id at 822.
169. See Commercial Ins. Co. v. Puente, 535 S.W.2d 948 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus
Christi 1976, writ refd n.r.e.); Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Hawkins, 387 S.W.2d 469
(Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1965, writ ref'd n.r.c.).
170. See Texas Employers' Ins. Ass'n v. Armstrong, 572 S.W.2d 565, 566 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1978, no writ); Texas General Indemnity Co. v. Cox, 544 S.W.2d 766, 768
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Texas State Highway Dep't v. Kinsler, 230 S.W.2d
364, 367 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1950, writ refd).
171. 628 S.W.2d at 822.
172. Id
173. Id
174. 636 S.W.2d 494 (Tex.. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ). The insurance car-
rier's second point of error involved admission of evidence. For discussion of this point, see
infra note 197 and accompanying text.
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upheld the jury's finding that the claimant had suffered a total and perma-
nent loss of use of his leg below the knee, even though the claimant had
returned to work at his previous place of employment. 75 The court ap-
plied the rule that in order to recover compensation for total loss of the use
of the leg, the employee had to establish either that the leg no longer had
any substantial utility or that he could not obtain and perform work re-
quiring use of the leg. 176
Discussing the requirements for establishing a permanent disability, the
court noted that permanent disability may reasonably be inferred from cir-
cumstantial evidence produced by lay witnesses even though such evi-
dence is contradicted by the testimony of medical experts. 177 Finding little
or no contradictory evidence in this case, the court stated that the em-
ployee should not be penalized for continuing to work at the expense of
pain and swelling.' 78 After reviewing the entire record, the court held that
the evidence was sufficient to sustain the jury finding of total loss of the use
of the leg. 7 9
In Allred v. Plains Insurance Co. 180 the jury found that the claimant was
totally incapacitated for a period of twenty-six weeks. The claimant, who
claimed disability for 402 weeks, appealed, alleging insufficient evidence
for the jury's finding.' 8' The court of appeals upheld the lower court judg-
ment, holding that while there was evidence that would have sustained a
longer period of total disability, ample evidence also existed to support the
jury's finding.' 82 The finding was not against the great weight and prepon-
derance of the evidence, which included evidence that the claimant had
been observed planting grass, unloading sacks of feed, and performing
other tasks after the injury.183
Galvan v. United States Fire Insurance Co. 184 involved an appeal after a
jury failed to find that the claimant received an injury while in the course
of his employment. The evidence on the issue of injury was contradictory.
The employee alleged that he received injuries while driving a tractor to a
jobsite, but he did not seek medical treatment until several months later.
Medical testimony indicated that the employee's condition was "probably"
related to the alleged accident. In upholding the jury finding against the
claimant the court of appeals held that because there is no fixed rule of
evidence dictating the requirements for the establishment of an injury, it
was for the jury to resolve the conflicts and contradictions in the evi-
dence.' 85 In his appeal the claimant proceeded on the theory that the
175. 636 S.W.2d at 501.
176. Id at 500.
177. Id at 502.
178. Id
179. Id
180. 626 S.W.2d 128 (Tex. Ct. App.-Waco 1981, writ ref d n.r.e.).
181. Id at 129.
182. Id at 130.
183. Id
184. 629 S.W.2d 209 (Tex. Ct. App.-Amarillo 1982, writ ref d n.r.e.).
185. Id at 215.
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jury's "No" answers to the special issues were affirmative findings that the
claimant did not suffer an injury and needed to be supported by evi-
dence.186 The court of appeals rejected that theory, pointing out that each
"No" answer was simply a failure or refusal by the jury to find from a
preponderance of the evidence the fact of any injury that the claimant had
the burden to establish affirmatively. 187
In Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co. v. Lynch 188 the court of appeals
reversed the judgment of the trial court that found the claimant totally and
permanently disabled. The sole question on appeal regarding sufficiency
of evidence concerned the duration of the incapacity, not the injury itself.
The court held that evidence that the claimant had returned to regular
employment, was not under medical treatment, and had not seen a doctor
for six or seven months, or a physical therapist for over a year, was insuffi-
cient to sustain the jury's finding that the worker was permanently dis-
abled. 89 The court remanded the cause for another trial. 90
C. Evidence--Medical
Last year, two courts of appeals applied the Texas Supreme Court's rul-
ing in Loper v. Andrews,' 9g that medical diagnoses resting on speculation
are not admissible, 92 to exclude certain portions of medical records sought
to be admitted under article 3737e. 193 In Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co.
v. Lynch ' 94 the insurance carrier sought to admit under article 3737e a
doctor's report that contained the doctor's opinion that the claimant "had
'recovered,' been 'discharged and cured,' was 'capable of doing same work
186. Id. at 213.
187. Id at 213 n.5.
188. 624 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ). For discussion of the ad-
mission of medical evidence in this case, see infra note 194 and accompanying text.
189. 624 S.W.2d at 700-01.
190. Id at 701.
191. 404 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. 1966).
192. In Loper the supreme court identified three types of medical diagnoses: (1) the
medical facts may be such that the medical condition is apparent and observable by all, such
as an open wound or a severed limb; or (2) the facts and findings may require an expert
interpretation, but the medical condition is nevertheless well recognized and reasonably cer-
tain, such as the diagnosis of leukemia; or (3) the facts and findings may be such that their
meaning and the resulting medical opinion as to the patient's condition rests primarily on
expert medical opinion, conjecture, and speculation. Id at 305. Loper holds that the third
type of medical diagnosis is inadmissible under article 3737e. Id
193. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983). Commonly re-
ferred to as the business records exception to the hearsay rule, art. 3737e, § I provides:
A memorandum or record of an act, event or condition shall, insofar as rele-
vant, be competent evidence of the occurrence of the act or event or the exist-
ence of the condition if the judge finds that:
(a) It was made in the regular course of business;
(b) It was the regular course of that business for an employee or representa-
tive of such business with personal knowledge of such act, event or condition
to make such memorandum or record or to transmit information thereof to be
included in such memorandum or record;
(c) It was made at or near the time of the act, event or condition or reason-
ably soon thereafter.
194. 624 S.W.2d 698 (Tex. Ct. App.-El Paso 1981, no writ).
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as before injury,' and suffered no 'permanent disability' from his 'left lum-
bar strain.' "195 Upholding the trial court's exclusion of this evidence, the
court of appeals held that the doctor's findings in the report the insurance
company sought to admit were expert conjecture, and thus inadmissible
under the Loper rule.196
The insurance carrier in Texas Employers' Insurance Association v.
Sauceda 197 sought to admit into evidence a letter from one treating physi-
cian that was included in another doctor's records Texas Employers' had
obtained through written interrogatories. The letter, which was written to
a representative of TEIA at the carrier's request, stated that in the doctor's
opinion the claimant had a ten percent permanent loss of the ankle's func-
tion as a result of the on-the-job injury; that since the claimant was back at
work and doing well, it would seem that his impairment had not caused
him to be disabled; and that the claimant could develop osteoarthritic
changes in his ankle in the future that could disable him in the future.
The court of appeals first considered whether the doctor's letter met the
conditions of article 3737e and concluded that the letter was not main-
tained as a part of the doctor's normal business procedure and was not
evidence of a routine entry made in the regular course of the doctor's busi-
ness, but rather was made at the request of TEIA's representative. 98 The
letter was sent approximately four months after the doctor's last examina-
tion of the claimant, and, therefore, was not made at or near the time of
the act, event, or condition or reasonably soon thereafter.' 99 Even if the
letter had met the conditions of article 3737e, the court held that under the
Loper rule the letter was properly excluded by the trial court because it did
not constitute a diagnosis of claimant's injury and offered no basis for the
opinion. The information contained in the letter did not record a condi-
tion resting in reasonable medical certainty, but was entirely conjectural
and speculative. 2°°
The admission by the trial court of a letter the claimant's attorney sent
to a doctor requesting the doctor's answers to certain questions concerning
the claimant's injury was the basis for the appeal in Associated Indemnity
Corp. v. Dixon .2Ol The letter, after establishing certain guidelines and pro-
viding definitions for "injury," "injury in the course of employinent,"
"producing cause," "sole cause," and "total incapacity" as used in the
Texas Workers' Compensation Act, contained questions, purported an-
swers, and the physician's initials, and was among the records in the medi-
cal files of another doctor.
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court and held that the letter
195. Id at 701.
196. Id The judgment of the trial court was reversed, and the cause remanded on the
issue of sufficiency of the evidence to support the jury finding. Id
197. 636 S.W.2d 494 (Tex. Ct. App.-San Antonio 1982, no writ).
198. Id. at 499; see TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 3737e (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983).
199. 636 S.W.2d at 499.
200. Id at 500.
201. 632 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Ct. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ret'd n.r.e.).
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was neither a medical record nor a business record, but rather constituted
inadmissible hearsay. 20 2 The court disagreed, however, with the trial
court's admission of the letter into evidence for the limited purpose of
showing a basis for the diagnosis of the second doctor. 20 3 Reversing the
trial court decision, the court of appeals held that the letter contained a
hearsay conclusion rather than a medical diagnosis of another physician
and, hence, was not information upon which a physician could rely in
reaching a medical opinion with respect to an employee's incapacity.2 °4
The court noted that medical experts may rely on reports from the patient,
on professional reports, treatises, and textbooks, and on another doctor's
examinations, tests, and diagnoses. 20 5 The court held that the admission of
the letter was not harmless because the letter gave an opinion on the ulti-
mate issue in the case, and the carrier had no opportunity to cross-examine
the doctor concerning the conclusion set forth in the letter. Thus, the court
remanded the case.20 6
The trial court had also admitted into evidence the testimony of the car-
rier's claims adjuster that in her opinion the claimant was totally incapaci-
tated. The testimony was admitted to show a prior inconsistent position of
the carrier with the carrier's position at trial. The court noted that asser-
tions of an agent or employee are admissible against the principal or em-
ployer as an exception to the hearsay rule only if the declaration is one of
fact as distinguished from mere opinion.20 7 Because the claims adjuster
testified solely on the basis of her prior opinion concerning the claimant's
injury, the court held that her testimony was hearsay and inadmissible. 208
202. Id at 835.
203. Id at 835-36.
204., Id
205. Id at 835.
206. Id at 836.
207. Id
208. Id
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